Minorities and Storable Votes by Casella, Alessandra et al.
DIVISION OF THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
PASADENA, CALIFORNIA 91125
MINORITIES AND STORABLE VOTES
Alessandra Casella
Columbia University
Thomas R. Palfrey
Princeton University and
California Institute of Technology
Raymond Riezman
University of Iowa
1 8 9 1
CA
LI
F
O
R
N
IA
 
IN
S T
IT U T E O F
 T E C
H
N
O
LO
G
Y
SOCIAL SCIENCE WORKING PAPER 1261R
December 2006
Revised October 2007
Minorities and Storable Votes∗
Alessandra Casella† Thomas Palfrey‡ Raymond Riezman§
Original version 2006, revised October 2007
Abstract
The paper studies a simple voting system that can increase the power of mi-
norities without sacrificing aggregate efficiency. Storable votes grant each voter a
stock of votes to spend as desired over a series of binary decisions, and thus elicit
voters’ intensity of preferences. The potential of the mechanism is particularly clear
in the presence of systematic minorities: by accumulating votes on issues that it
deems most important, the minority can win occasionally. But because the majority
typically can outvote it, the minority wins only if its strength of preference is high
and the majority’s strength of preference is low. The result is that the minority’s
preferences are represented, while aggregate efficiency either falls little or in fact
rises, relative to simple majority voting. The theoretical predictions of our model
are confirmed by a series of experiments: the frequency of minority victories, the
relative payoff of the minority versus the majority, and the aggregate payoffs all
match the theory.
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1 Introduction
Recent decades have witnessed historic efforts at designing democratic institutions, at
many levels. New constitutions were created in much of Eastern Europe and the for-
mer Soviet Republics, international organizations such as the European Union and the
World Trade Organization have been evolving rapidly, and many developing countries
have moved from autocratic regimes to regimes based on elected representation with ma-
joritarian principles.
While majoritarian principles may provide a solid foundation for democracy, there
are imperfections. This paper focuses on one particular imperfection that has presented a
challenge to designers of democratic institutions for centuries: the tyranny of the majority,
or the risk of excluding minority groups from representation. At least since Madison,
Mill, and Tocqueville, political thinkers have argued that a necessary condition for the
legitimacy of a democratic system is for no group with socially acceptable goals to be
disenfranchised. In the history of US constitutional law, ensuring fair representation to
each group is seen as the crucial second step in the evolution of democratic institutions,
after granting the franchise: once all individuals are guaranteed the right to participate in
the political process, the question becomes what are the appropriate weights given to each
group’s political interest. The core of the difficulty is that the two goals seem inherently
contradictory.
The 1965 Voting Rights Act and the debate that continues to accompany its imple-
mentation focus on the need to guarantee that minorities, in particular, racial minorities,
have some direct representation. The obstacle is the possibility that their vote be de facto
”diluted” by their minority status in all districts. In this paper we study a related but
different problem: the respect of minority preferences not in the choice of representatives,
but in the very act of decision-making. And we argue for it not only on the basis of
fairness and legitimacy, but also on grounds of aggregate efficiency. Chwe (1999) took a
similar perspective, arguing for granting ”special” voting power to the minority to ensure
its participation when voting aggregates diffuse information. We base our analysis on
private value considerations - voting in our model aggregates divergent preferences, not
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diffuse information. But the efficiency rationale remains. A simple example illustrates
why.
Suppose there are just two groups in a polity comprised of 100 citizens. Group A
has 55 members and group B has 45 members. There are 3 proposals on the table. All
citizens in group A have identical preferences and strictly prefer to pass all proposals; all
citizens in group B have identical preferences and strictly prefer the status quo on all 3
issues. Thus, group B fits our definition of a minority. Table 1 gives a specific utility
function for each member on each issue, and preferences are assumed to be additive. For
each citizen, the utility of the less preferred option is normalized to 0.
Issue UA(pass) UA(sq) UB(pass) UB(sq)
1 3 0 0 1
2 2 0 0 2
3 1 0 0 3
Note that the intensity of preferences varies across the issues, and on a given issue the
preference intensity for a group A member may be different from the intensity of a group
B member. That is, some issues are ”more important” to one group than to the other
group - issue 1 is important to group A but not to group B, and issue 3 is important to
group B but not to group A.
Now consider what would happen with simple majority rule when issues are decided
independently: since group A has a majority, all three proposals pass. Indeed, even if
there were a million different issues, group A would always have a majority on all issues,
so the B citizens are effectively disenfranchised - the outcome is exactly the same as it
would be in a political system where only A citizens were allowed to vote.
Why is this outcome undesirable? First, equity considerations demand that the mi-
nority be able to win on at least some issues. But in addition, from a purely utilitarian
standpoint, there are plausible welfare criteria according to which the outcome is socially
inefficient. In our example, if each individual is treated equally and decisions are evalu-
ated ex ante, before membership into the groups is known, the status quo should prevail
on issue 3. Thus, the tyranny of the majority imposes costs both in terms of equity and in
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terms of efficiency. The equity problem stems from the existence of a smaller group whose
preferences are systematically in the opposite direction of the larger group’s preferences.
The efficiency problem stems from differences in the strength of preferences of the two
groups. But nothing fundamental depends on all citizens in a group having the same
intensity of preferences on every issue, a simplification adopted only to keep the example
transparent.1
How can the tyranny of the majority problem be solved, or at least mitigated? Any
solution must deviate from issue-by-issue simple majority voting system. An immediate
possibility might be vote trading or some corresponding log-rolling scheme: members of
one group could trade their vote on one issue in exchange for votes on other issues. But, in
the simple example we constructed above, there are no gains across groups, because every
A citizen is already winning on all issues. Any system that allows the minority group
to win on even one issue will make all A citizens worse off, and thus would not emerge
spontaneously through vote trading. With the perfect correlation of preferences we have
posited above, an explicit institution ”re-enfranchising” the minority is necessary.
Consider then, endowing every voter with an initial stock of votes, and rather than
requiring voters to cast exactly one vote on each issue, allowing them to lump their votes
together, casting ”heavier” votes on some issues and ”lighter” votes on other issues. It
is this voting mechanism, called storable votes, that we study in this paper. As we prove
below, storable votes allow the minority to win some of the time, and in particular, to win
when its preferences are most intense. And because the majority generally holds more
votes, it is in a position to overrule the minority if it cares to do so: the minority can
win only those issues over which its strength of preferences is high and, at the same time,
the majority’s preference intensity is weak. But these are exactly the issues where the
minority ”should” win from an efficiency viewpoint: the equity gains resulting from the
possibility of occasional minority’s victory need not come at a cost to aggregate efficiency.
In most of the specifications of the environment that we study in this paper, we find
that standard economic measures of aggregate efficiency rise with storable votes. The
1The central idea also does not depend on the direction of preferences within the group being perfectly
correlated either - there may be some conflicting preferences within groups.
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main contribution of this paper then is not to suggest a new reason to increase minority’s
representation but to propose a specific voting scheme with the potential to achieve this
goal even in the case of a systematic minority, when other voting mechanisms would fail,
and to do so without violating the equal treatment of all voters.
The topic of minorities is felt so intensely, and the terms are so emotionally loaded,
that there is a need to be scrupulously clear in terminology. As the example makes clear,
we define a minority as a clearly identifiable group characterized by two features: first, a
relatively small numerical size; second, preferences that are systematically different from
the preferences of the rest of the polity. Thus, a minority in this paper is a political
minority, which may, but need not, correspond to a minority according to racial, ethnic,
religious or any other type of considerations. In terms of political decisions, what matters
in the present context are the coherent and idiosyncratic preferences of the group, as
opposed to the specific source of its identity.
The use of storable votes was initially proposed in Casella (2005), in a model that
ignored systematic minorities. The desirable efficiency properties of storable votes remain
true there, because the basic principle of bunching ones votes on more salient decisions
continues to apply, with the implication that the probability of obtaining the desired
outcome shifts away from decisions that matter little and towards decisions that matter
more, with positive welfare effects. Storable votes are a particularly natural application
of the idea that preferences can be elicited by linking independent decisions through a
common budget constraint, an idea that can be exploited quite generally, as shown by
Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007).2 From a practical point of view it is in the application
to the protection of minority interests – circumventing the tyrranny of the majority –
that seems particularly useful. Storable votes has the potential to increase efficiency
while improving equity at the same time.
2Jackson and Sonnenschein propose a specific mechanism that converges to the first best allocation
as the number of decisions grows large. The mechanism allows individuals to assign different priority to
different actions but constrains their choices in a tighly specified manner. The design of the correct menu
of choices offered to the agents is complex, but the mechanism achieves the first best. Storable votes are
simple but in general do not achieve the first best.
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A voting system similar to storable votes is cumulative voting, a mechanism used in
single multi-candidate elections. It grants each voter a budget of votes, with the pro-
viso that the votes can spread or concentrated on as many or few of the candidates as
the voter wishes. Cumulative voting has been advocated for the protection of minority
rights (Guinier, 1994) and has been recommended by the courts to redress violations
of fair representation in local elections (Issacharoff, Karlan and Pildes, 2002). There is
theoretical (Cox, 1990), experimental (Gerber, Morton and Rietz, 1998), and empirical
(Bowler, Donovan and Brockington, 2003) evidence that cumulative voting does indeed
help minorities. The general motivation behind the storable votes mechanism is similar
to cumulative voting, but storable votes applies to a sequence of independent binary deci-
sions, a substantively different strategic problem, with different applications. In addition,
we explicitly study the efficiency properties of the mechanism, as well as its distributional
effects on minorities.
The desirable properties of storable votes are features of the equilibrium of the resulting
voting game – they emerge if every voter chooses the correct number of votes, given
what he rationally expects others to do. But, in practice there is a need to consider the
robustness of the mechanism. Could the outcome be much worse if voters made mistakes?
This is an appropriate concern here because the storable votes game is quite complex:
voters need to trade-off the different probabilities of casting the pivotal vote along the
full logical tree of possible scenarios, a task further complicated by coordination problems
within the two groups, and multiple equilibria. If actual voters were confronted with the
problem, what type of decisions would they make?
The second part of the paper presents the results of a set of experiments showing that
under storable votes, the minority does indeed win on a significant number of issues. Both
the minority payoff and the aggregate efficiency of the mechanism match the theoretical
predictions, indicating that the equity gains accrue with little or no loss of efficiency. Vot-
ers use responsive strategies, consistently casting more votes when valuations are higher,
a behavior that appears sufficient to take them most of the way towards their equilibrium
payoffs. These conclusions are qualified by the different cost of mistakes faced by ma-
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jority members, who are likely to win anyway, and minority members, whose deviations
are particularly costly (and rarer in the data). Previous experiments with storable votes
in symmetric environments (Casella, Gelman and Palfrey, 2006) had found a similar ro-
bustness of efficiency properties to strategic mistakes, but the introduction of minorities
complicates the game very significantly. The success of the minority side to appropriate
a significant share of the surplus available to them was a surprising and encouraging sign
of the practical viability of the mechanism.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents the basic model. In section
3, we present theoretical results about the possibility of minority victories and its effect
on efficiency under storable votes. Section 4 describes the experimental design and section
5 the experimental results. We conclude in section 6. The Appendix provides the proofs
not included in the main text.
2 The Model
A committee with n members meets for T periods to vote over a series of binary proposals
{P1, ..., PT}, each of which can either pass or fail. Voter i’s preferences over proposal Pt
are summarized by a valuation vit ∈ R. A positive valuation means that the voter is in
favor of the proposal, a negative valuation means that the voter is against, and voter i’s
payoff from each proposal is given by |vit| ≡ vit if the outcome of the vote is as he desires,
and 0 otherwise. Thus voter i’s utility function has the form:
Ui(P1, ...PT ) =
T∑
t−1
uit(Pt)
where
uit(Pt) = vit if{.vit > 0 and Pt passesvit < 0 and Pt fails
= 0 otherwise
The magnitude of the valuation, vit, is called the preference intensity of voter i on pro-
posal t. The profile of valuations, v= (v11, ...,v1T , ..,vn1, ...,vnT ), is a random variable
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that is distributed according to the commonly known distribution Γ(v), satisfying the
assumptions we detail below.
The committee is composed of two groups, the Majority group M, with M members
and the Minority group m, with m < M members. The two groups differ systematically
in their preferences: members of m are in favor of all proposals, and members of M are
against. For all t:
vit > 0 if i ∈m
vit < 0 if i ∈M
All members of the minority have valuations drawn from a distribution Gm with sup-
port [0, 1] , identical across proposals, while all members of the majority have valuations
drawn from a distribution GM with support [−1, 0], again identical across proposals. We
assume symmetry in the distributions across the two groups and call G′M = G
′
m ≡ F
defined over the support [0, 1] the distribution of intensities for each group. F is common
knowledge.
Intensities are always drawn independently across proposals and across the two groups.
With respect to the correlation of the intensites within each group, we consider two polar
cases. In the first case (case B), intensities are drawn independently for each member
of a group; in the second case (case C) intensities are identical for all members within a
group. Hence, although all members of a group always agree on the preferred outcome,
in the B case they may have conflicting priorities, while they do not in the C case. The
correlation of within group intensities (or lack thereof) is common knowledge, as is the
independence of intensities across proposals and groups.
At the beginning of period t, i privately observes vit but does not observe vit′ for
t′ > t: intensities are revealed privately and sequentially. Because draws are independent
across issues, voter i’s observation of vit does not provide information about vit′ , and
because draws are independent across groups, observation of vit, i ∈m, does not provide
information about vjt, j ∈ M (and vice versa). Whether it provides information about
the intensity of other voters in the same group, vjt, with j ∈m, depends on which case we
consider. In case C,members of the same group have identical preferences and observation
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of their own intensity allows them to perfectly infer the preferences of the other members
of their group. In case B, a voter’s own intensity provides no information about any other
voter’s intensity.
2.1 The Storable Votes Mechanism
At the beginning of period 1, each voter is endowed with an account of B0 ”bonus” votes,
where B0 is an integer.
3 In the first period, the voter casts his regular vote plus as
many discrete bonus votes as he wishes out of his endowment. The bonus votes cast are
deducted from his endowment, which is then carried over to the next period. The current
endowment of bonus votes for every voter in period t, denoted Bt = (B1t, ..., Bnt), is
common knowledge at the beginning of period t. Thus each voter i independently decides
how many votes, xit, to cast after observing his private valuation vit and Bt, subject to
xit ≤ 1 + Bit. The proposal passes if there are more votes in favor of the proposal than
against, and fails in the opposite case. Ties are resolved randomly. In the next period,
t + 1, voters’ valuations over the new proposal are again privately observed, and voting
proceeds as before, now subject to the constraint, xit+1 ≤ 1+Bit+1 = 2+Bit− xit. Since
xit ≥ 1, this is at least as tight a constraint as in period t. The voting continues in this
fashion until the end of period T .
3 Theoretical results
Given F,m,M,B0, T the storable votes mechanism defines an asymmetric multistage
game of incomplete information. We study the properties of the Perfect Bayesian equilib-
ria of this game, where at each period t and for each possible intensity, vit, and profile of
endowments, Bt, individuals choose how many votes to cast so as to maximize expected
utility, given the strategies of the other players. Because the sign of each group’s prefer-
ences is common knowledge and intensities are independent over time, voting decisions
3Because we want to study the effect of bonus votes per se in strengthening the minority’s position,
it seems appropriate to give the same initial allocation to all voters.
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cannot be used to manipulate other players’ beliefs about future preferences. Assuming,
in addition, that players do not use weakly dominated strategies, the direction of each
individual vote is always chosen sincerely: all the minority members’ votes are cast in
favor of each proposal, and all majority votes are cast against each proposal. The state of
the game at t is defined to be the profile of bonus votes each voter has still available, Bt,
and the number of remaining periods, T − t. We focus on strategies such that the number
of votes each individual chooses to cast each period, xit, depends only on the intensity
of preferences at time t, vit, and on the state of the game. We denote such strategies by
xit(vi, Bt, t).
3.1 The C2 game
When characterizing the equilibria of our model, the correlation of intensities within each
group in model C can be a source of complications. But matters can be simplified by
a simple observation. Consider the following 2-player storable votes game, which we
call C2. Voter M has M regular votes each period and a stock of MB0 bonus votes;
his valuation over each proposal is MvMt where vMt is independently drawn from the
distribution function FM with support [−1, 0]. Voter m has m regular votes each period
and a stock of mB0 bonus votes; his valuation over each proposal is mvmt where vmt is
independently drawn from the distribution function Fm with support [0, 1]. Then the
following result holds:
Lemma 1. If game C2 has an equilibrium, then the game described by model C also
has an equilibrium. In addition, call x∗Mt(vi, Bt, t) and x
∗
mt(vi, Bt, t) the equilibrium strate-
gies of voter M and voter m in game C2, and {x∗it(vi, Bt, t)} the equilibrium strategies
in C. If C2 has an equilibrium, then there exist equilibrium strategies of model C such
that
∑
i∈m x
∗
it(vi, Bt, t) = x
∗
mt(vi, Bt, t) and
∑
i∈M x
∗
it(vi, Bt, t) = x
∗
Mt(vi, Bt, t).
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 1 makes a simple point. In model C voters’ interests within each group are
perfectly aligned; if there is an equilibrium where each group coordinates its strategy so
9
as to maximize the group’s payoff, given the aggregate strategy of the other group, then
no individual voter can gain from deviating.4 In the n-person game described by model
C, we will call equilibrium group strategies the equilibrium individual strategies of the
2-voter game C2.
3.2 Equilibrium
The particular feature of storable votes is that they allow individuals to reflect the in-
tensity of their preferences in the number of votes they cast. Lemma 1 allows us to
show:
Lemma 2. For any F , M , m and T , both model B and model C have an equilibrium
in monotone cutpoint strategies: at any state (Bt, t) and for any i with Bi + 1 available
votes there exists a set of cutpoints {ci1(Bt, t), ci2(Bt, t), . . . , ciBi+1(Bt, t)}, 0 ≤ cix ≤
cix+1 ≤ 1, such that i will cast x votes if and only if vit ∈ [cix, cix+1]. In model B, the
strategies are individual equilibrium strategies and i ∈ {1, .., n}; in model C, the strategies
are group strategies and i ∈ {M,m}.
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 2 establishes that an equilibrium exists, although it does not rule out the
possibility of multiple equilibria. Notice also that the lemma states that strategies may
respond to valuations, as we expect intuitively, but allows for equilibria where the mono-
tonicity is only weak - for example, possible equilibria where bonus votes are equally split
among proposals, or where strategies depend on the timing of the proposals alone.
Storable votes open the possibility of minority victories. We can derive:
Theorem 1. In both models B and C: (i) For any F , T , M , and m > 1 there is
a finite B′0(M,m, T ) such that for all B0 > B
′
0 there exist equilibria of the storable votes
mechanism where the minority wins some of the time with strictly positive probability. (ii)
If T > M and B0 > B
′
0, then the minority wins some of the time with strictly positive
4This is the logic exploited by McLennan (1998) to show that whenever ”sincere” voting is efficient in
common value decision problems, then it must be a Nash equilibrium.
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probability in all equilibria of the mechanism.
Proof. See Appendix.
The first part of the theorem establishes the existence of equilibria with a positive
probability of minority victories, in direct contrast to the outcome with simple majority
voting. The potential of storable votes to help the minority is very intuitive, although
for arbitrary T the result cannot be established for all equilibria. The problem is coordi-
nation: in both models B and C (although not in C2, where coordination is imposed) if
the other members of the minority follow a given strategy, it is difficult for a single devi-
ating voter to be able to affect the final outcome, and thus strategies where the minority
always loses can be supported in equilibrium. As an illustration, consider one possible
equilibrium mentioned above, where every voter, both in the majority and in minority,
distributes the bonus votes equally over all proposals: xi = 1+B0/T for all i ∈ {1, .., n}.
Because everyone always casts the same number of votes, the game becomes identical to
simple majority voting, and the minority always loses. But unless a single minority voter
deviating alone can lead to at least one proposal passing, the strategies are an equilibrium
for both models B and C.5 Notice that if T = 2 this equililbrium exists for all values
of B0: a deviating minority voter can shift at most B0/2 votes, but over each proposal
the majority is always winning by at least 1 + B0/2 votes (since M ≥ m + 1). Thus, for
T = 2 there is always at least one equilibrium where the minority always loses, regardless
of the existence and of the number of bonus votes (although, as the theorem states, for
appropriate values of B0 there are also equilibria where the minority can win with positive
probability).
3.3 Efficiency
Making it possible for the minority to win occasionally favors fairness and representa-
tion, but in principle could have efficiency costs because it implies that the larger group
occasionally loses. However, even from a pure efficiency criterion, storable votes can be
5As mentioned, the strategies described are not equilibrium strategies for model C2. Lemma 1 states
that the equilibria of model C2 are equilibria of model C; the reverse does not hold.
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desirable. In equilibria where strategies are strictly monotonic, the minority wins when
minority intensities outweigh majority intensities: the minority wins ”when it should”.
We measure the efficiency of the storable votes mechanism in terms of ex ante ef-
ficiency: a voter’s expected utility from all T proposals before any of his valuations is
realized, and before knowing whether he belongs to M or to m. We call our efficiency
measure EV0 and contrast it with the equivalent measure under simple majority voting,
denoted by EW0.
6
The positive impact on efficiency of monotonic strategies applies to both models, but
the properties of the voting mechanism are more robust and easier to characterize in
model C.
Theorem 2. In model C, for all F , M and m > M/2, if T < T (M,m) there exists a
value of B0 and an equilibrium of the storable votes mechanism such that storable votes
are ex ante superior to simple majority voting (i.e. EV0 > EW0).
Proof. See Appendix.
A few remarks will clarify the result. Note first of all that the difference in expected
utility can occur only if the minority is expected to win sometime; thus, in the equilibrium
discussed in the theorem the minority itself necessarily fares better, in expected utility
terms, than under simple majority voting. Note too that the minority could never win if
the horizon were shorter than 2 periods; thus, again trivially, T (M,m) > 2 for all M and
m. The existence of an upper boundary on T comes not from the logic of the mechanism
6An important question is whether the cardinal valuations and our notion of efficiency force us into
comparisons of interpersonal utilities. This is where our assumption of symmetrical distributions of
intensities across all voters plays its role. The intensity draws over any specific decision should be read
as normalized by a common numeraire. In our model with multiple decisions, the natural numeraire is
the individual’s mean intensity over the universe of all decisions that could be brought to a vote. In fact,
by imposing not only the same mean but the same distribution, we are forcing the voters to adopt an
equal scale and to organize the different decisions according to a fixed ordinal ranking, with the same
proportion of decisions in any given subinterval of the support. It is this normalization that allows us to
avoid interpersonal comparisons. In this model, granting individual voters different distributions would
be equivalent to taking a stance on the relative intensity of their preferences.
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but from the need to repect integer constraints: for all M and m, we require that the
number of votes cast be always an integer. The proof shows that if integer constraints
are ignored, T (M,m) can be made arbitrarily large for all M and m, and the result then
holds for arbitrary T .
The result in the theorem requires not only that the minority be expected to win with
positive probability, but also that equilibrium strategies be responsive to valuations: at
least in some states strategies must be strictly monotonic. The difficulty in establishing
the theorem is identifying equilibrium majority and minority cutpoints at each state such
that expected minority gains and majority losses can be computed and compared for all
F , M , m and T . This is particularly true for model B, where the lack of information
about the valuations of other members of one’s own group makes coordination impossible.
If we specialize our assumptions on F , M , m, and T the task is made much easier. The
next subsection discusses the theoretical properties of the model when we restrict the set
of parameter values, in line with the choices that we make in the experiment.
3.4 Theoretical Properties of the Experimental Design.
In designing the experiment, the challenge is to specify a class of environments simple
enough to be easily understood and replicated in the laboratory, but rich enough to
preserve the main properties of the mechanism. The following specification satisfies these
requirements: the total number of voters n is odd; the distribution F is Uniform; there are
two consecutive proposals and each voter is endowed with two bonus votes: T = B0 = 2.
The strategy chosen by each voter is simply the number of bonus votes to cast over the first
proposal, as a function of his valuation. The proposition below characterizes equilibria
for our experimental environment, where strategies are responsive to intensities and are
an equilibrium not only for models B and C but also for model C2.7
Proposition. Suppose n odd; F Uniform, and T = B0 = 2. Then:
In model B:
a. There is an equilibrium where: xi1 = 1 if vi1 < 0.5 and xi1 = 3 if vi1 > 0.5 for all i.
7Recall, from earlier discussion, that there can also be nonresponsive equilibria.
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In such an equilibrium:
b. If M > 3m, the majority always wins, but for all M < 3m the minority wins one
of the two proposals with probability
∑m
s=k
[∑m−s
r=0
(
M
r
)(
m
r+s
)
2−n
]
> 0 where k ≡
(M − m + 1)/2. Ex ante, each of the two proposals has the same probability of a
minority victory.
c. f M > 3m, storable votes are identical to simple majority voting, and EV0 = EW0.
But for M < 3m, there exist m′, m′′ and M ′ with m′′ > m′ such that EV0(m′,M ′) <
EW0(m
′,M ′) but EV0(m′′,M ′) > EW0(m′′,M ′).
In model C:
a. There is an equilibrium where the minority’s strategy is: xm1 = m if vm1 < 0.5 and
xm1 = 3m if vm1 > 0.5. The majority’s strategy is: if 2M > 3m, xM1 = 2M
for all vM1; if 2M ≤ 3m, xM1 = max{M,m + 3} if vM1 < 0.5 and xM1 =
min{3M, 4M − (m+ 3)} if vM1 > 0.5.
In such an equilibrium:
b. If 2M > 3m, the majority always wins, but for all 2M ≤ 3m the minority wins one
of the two proposals with probability 0.25. Ex ante, each of the two proposals has
the same probability of a minority victory.
c. Storable votes are always ex ante weakly superior to simple majority voting: EV0 =
EW0 if 2M > 3m, and EV0 > EW0 if 2M ≤ 3m.
Proof. See Appendix.
Together, restricting n, F and T allows us to idenitify the equilibrium cutpoints and
derive stronger efficiency results than in the general case discussed in Theorem 2.
The properties of these equilibria are illustrated in Figure 1, using the case of M =
m+1 as an example. Efficiency is maximized when each decision is resolved in favor of the
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side with higher total valuation, and in the figure we compare equilibrium and efficient
outcomes.
Figure 1 here
Figure 1a shows, for both models, the probability of a minority victory over one
of the two proposals in equilibrium - the black dots - and in the first best - the grey
dots. The minority can never win both proposals because the majority always has a
larger total number of votes. As m increases, the equilibrium probability of a minority
victory increases. In model B, the increase is smooth, and the probability of a minority
victory converges to 0.5 as the number of voters becomes large and the relative difference
becomes negligible. The efficient frequency of minority victories is slightly higher than the
equilibrium frequency. In model C, the change in the equilibrium probability of minority
victories is discontinuous, jumping from 0 to 0.25 when the majority becomes unable to
guarantee itself victory on both proposals, and then remaining constant at that level.
The point at which the jump occurs depends on the absolute difference between the two
groups, M −m. The efficient frequency of minority victories on the other hand increases
smoothly with the relative size of the minority and is always higher than the equilibrium
frequency.
Figure 1b plots the expected per capita payoff for majority and minority members.
With simple majority rule, the respective values are 1 and 0 in both models. With
storable votes, the expected payoffs of the two groups are closer, unless the majority can
ensure itself victory, although the minority’s payoff remains lower than under efficiency
(the grey dots in Figure 1b). In model C, equilibrium per capita payoffs remain constant
for each group, regardless of m, once the threshold where the majority always wins has
been passed.8
Figure 1c plots a normalized measure of expected surplus for both models, where
expected aggregate payoff is expressed as a share of the expected first best payoff. The
8In fact, they remain unchanged for any absolute difference between the two groups, once the threshold
3m < 2M has been passed. It is the threshold itself that depends on (M −m).
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figure compares storable votes and simple majority voting to each other and to the first
best efficiency. Because we want to measure the added value over purely random decision-
making (where each proposal is equally likely to pass or fail), we normalize both numerator
and denominator by the expected payoff in the random mechanism. Thus if we call EV ∗0
the expected efficient aggregate payoff and R the expected payoff under random decision-
making, we define the normalized aggregate surplus as (EV0−R)/(EV ∗0 −R) with storable
votes and (EW0−R)/(EV ∗0 −R) with simple majority. Over the two proposals, EW0 =M
and R = (M +m)/2 in both models, while EV0 and EV
∗
0 are derived in the Appendix.
As the figure shows, when the number of voters is small and the difference in size between
the two groups relatively important, the possibility of minority victories in the storable
votes mechanism is accompanied by some loss of efficiency in model B, but not in model
C, where efficiency is always at least as high as under simple majority rule. The loss
in model B is not large and disappears as the number of voters and the relative size of
the minority increases. For most sizes of the electorate, storable votes allow voters to
appropriate a larger share of the total surplus in both models.9
9The main difference between the two models emerges in the limit, and is not visible in the figure. In
model B, the intensity draws are independent; hence, as the population becomes very large the law of large
numbers guarantees that the empirical average intensity of preferences in both groups converges to the
mean of the F distribution. This means that random choice, simple majority voting and storable votes all
converge to first best efficiency and any efficiency-based argument for protecting the minority disappears.
In model C, on the other hand, the valuation draws within each group are perfectly correlated, and the
law of large numbers does not apply. As the number of voters increases, the difference in size between the
two groups becomes negligible and simple majority voting again converges to random choice, but random
choice remains inferior to efficient decision-making and to storable votes. In very large populations, only
minorities whose intensities are correlated should be protected on efficiency grounds.
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4 Experimental design
4.1 Protocol
All sessions of the experiment were run either at Caltech (SSEL) UCLA (CASSEL), and
Princeton (PLESS). Subjects were registered students, recruited through the laboratory
web sites. No subject participated in more than one session. All sessions focussed on
the specification just discussed: subjects voted on two consecutive proposals (T = 2)
and were allocated 2 bonus votes (B0 = 2), in addition to the regular vote they were
required to cast over each proposal. With the exception of one session, committees were
composed of 5 voters, divided into two groups of 3 and 2 voters with systematically
opposed preferences.10 The experiment’s primary treatment variable was the correlation
of intensities within each group - the distinction between model B and model C.
After entering the laboratory, the subjects were seated randomly in booths separated
by partitions and assigned ID numbers corresponding to their computer terminal; when
everyone was seated, the experimenter read aloud the instructions, and any questions
were answered publicly. The session then began.11 Subjects were matched randomly into
committees and within each committee were assigned randomly to the majority or the
minority group. Each subject was then shown his valuation for the first proposal and
asked to choose how many votes to cast in the first election. Valuations were restricted
to integer values and were drawn by the computer, with equal probability, from the
support [−100,−1] for majority members, and from [1, 100] for minority members. In
both treatments, the valuations were drawn independently for majority and minority
members.
In treatment B each member of each group was assigned a valuation drawn indepen-
dently from the specified support; in treatment C all members of the same group in the
same committee were assigned the same valuation (i.e. all majority members in a given
10One session had committees of 9 voters, each divided into two opposite groups of sizes 5 and 4.
11A sample of the instructions can be downloaded from http://www.hss.caltech.edu/˜trp/MINORITIES.
The experiments were conducted using the Multistage Game open-source software
(http://multistage.ssel.caltech.edu/).
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committee shared the same valuation, as did all minority members in a committee). The
independence of the intensities within each group in treatment B and their perfect cor-
relation in treatment C were common knowledge. After everyone in a committee had
voted, the computer screen showed to each subject the number of votes cast by each of
the two groups in the subject’s committee, whether the proposal had passed or not, and
the subject’s own payoff from that election. Valuations over the second proposal were
then drawn, the remaining votes were automatically cast and the outcome determined.
After the second proposal had been voted upon, subjects were rematched, each was
assigned a new budget of bonus votes, and the game was replayed. Experimental sessions
consisted of between 15 or 30 rounds, each round a pair of consecutive proposals. In the
rematching, minority members always remained minority members and majority mem-
bers always remained majority members, but the composition of each group and of each
committee was randomly determined. Subjects were paid privately at the end of each
session their cumulative valuations for all proposals resolved in their preferred direction,
multiplied by a pre-determined exchange rate and complemented by a fixed show-up pay-
ment of $10. Average earnings were about $17 per experiment for minority subjects and
about $31 for majority subjects.
4.2 Equilibrium
We found no evidence of non-responsive equilibria, and our experimental analysis will
focus exclusively on the equilibrium described in the previous section. Here we derive the
details of the equlibrium for the specific case M = 3, and m = 2 (and for a robustness
control in one experimental section, for M = 5, and m = 4). Individual equilibrium
strategies in treatment B and corresponding equilibrium outcomes are in Table 1. The
equilibrium cutpoints - the threshold intensities where individual voters switch from cast-
ing 0 to casting 1 bonus vote, and from casting 1 to casting 2 - are reported in row 2
of Table 1 and are denoted c1 and c2.
12 Rows 3 and 4 in the table report the expected
12Because the equilibrium cutpoints are identical for minority and majority voters, we use the symbols
c1 and c2 for both groups.
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frequency of minority victories in equilibrium and under ex post efficiency, respectively.
Rows 5 and 6 report the expected share of per capita payoff for a minority voter, relative
to a majority voter, again in equilibrium and under ex post efficiency. So, for example,
in the {3, 2} experiment with storable votes a minority subject is expected to win on
average 26% of what a majority subject earns, if everybody plays the equilibrium strat-
egy. Finally, the last two rows report the expected share of normalized aggregate surplus
appropriated with storable votes (row 7) and with simple majority voting (row 8).
Table 1: Equilibrium strategies and outcomes.
B Treatment
M , m 3, 2 5, 4
c1, c2 50, 50 50, 50
% min wins, sv 19 25
% min wins, eff 22.5 28.5
% (min/maj) payoff, sv 26 36
% (min/maj) payoff, eff 35.5 45
% surplus sv 71 61
% surplus nsv 75 62
Storable votes in the B treatment are slightly less efficient from an aggregate point of
view than simple majority voting, but the equilibrium efficiency loss is minor, relative to
the effect of storable votes on the welfare of minorities.
Equilibrium strategies in treatment C pose a coordination problem. As described in
the previous section, if the two groups are of size {3, 2}, in equilibrium the minority uses
no bonus votes if its intensity is smaller than 50, and all its bonus votes if it is above;
the majority casts a total of 5 votes if its intensity is smaller than 50, and 7 votes if it is
larger than 50.13
13When the two groups are of size {3, 2}, the majority has other valuation-responsive equilibrium
strategies, but all are payoff-equivalent and all are monotonic, and we treat them as identical when
reporting the experimental results. All equilibrium strategies satisfy: cast 0, 1, or 2 bonus votes with
probabilities p0, p1, p2 if the absolute valuation is smaller than 50, and 4, 5, or 6 bonus votes with
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Any individual strategy compatible with these group strategies is an equilibrium.
Hence, each minority voter has a simple symmetrical strategy that aggregates to the
equilibrium group strategy: cast no bonus votes if the intensity is below 50 and cast all
(2) bonus votes if the intensity is 50 or above. But the coordination problem for majority
voters is more difficult. The group strategy described above cannot be supported by
symmetric individual strategies, and coordination on asymmetric strategies is hampered
by the random rematching in our experimental design. In fact, for our experimental
environment, not only is there no symmetric individual strategy that aggregates to the
equilibrium group strategy, but there is no asymmetric strategy that each majority voter
can adopt consistently and that would always aggregate to the equilibrium group strategy,
for any possible rematching.
In practice, our basic C treatment is then a test of the robustness of storable votes’
outcomes to coordination problems. To evaluate the role of coordination more precisely,
we designed two additional treatments that replicate model C but where coordination
problems are absent by construction.
Treatment C2 mirrored the C2 game: for each group, a single voter cast votes on
behalf of all members of that group. Each majority group representative had 3 indivisible
regular votes to cast on each of the two proposals and 6 bonus votes to cast as desired.
Each minority group representative had 2 indivisible regular votes to spend on each of
the two proposals and 4 bonus votes to cast as desired. Each committee then consisted
of one minority and one majority representative. For each proposal, valuations were
drawn independently with equal probability, from the support [−100,−1] for the majority
representative, and from [1, 100] for the minority one. The timing of the game proceeded as
described earlier. After each two-proposal round, group representatives were rematched.
When we discuss experimental payoffs from this treatment, we multiply the minority
representative’s payoff by 2 and the majority’s by 3, to make them comparable to the
theoretical predictions and to the experimental payoffs for the C case and for the following
treatment, which we call CChat.
probabilities q0, q1, q2 if the absolute valuation is larger than 50, where p2 ≥ q2 and p1 = q1. The
strategy described in the text corresponds to p0 = p1 = 0, and q1 = q2 = 0.
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In treatment CChat (”correlated valuations, chat option”) we replicated the C treat-
ment, but each group composed of multiple individual voters rather than just 2 repre-
sentatives. Before the vote on the first proposal, voters could exchange messages via
computer with other members of the same group. Voters were instructed not to identify
themselves, and the messages were anonymous but otherwise unconstrained. In partic-
ular, they allowed subjects to coordinate on their preferred group strategy. Everything
else in the experiment - the stochastic properties of the valuation draws, the timing, the
random re-matching - followed exactly the C treatment, with perfectly correlated values
within a group.
Equilibrium group strategies and expected outcomes are identical in the three C treat-
ments - C, C2, and CChat. They are reported in Table 2, where gL and gH denote the
cutpoints where both groups switch from casting 0 bonus votes to casting 2, and from
casting 2 to casting 4.
Table 2: Equilibrium group strategies and outcomes.
C Treatments
M , m 3, 2
gL, gH 50, 50
% min wins, sv 25
% min wins, eff 33
% (min/maj) payoff, sv 38.5
% (min/maj) payoff, eff 52
% surplus sv 60
% surplus nsv 53
The outcome is more favorable to the minority in model C than in model B, both in
terms of the expected frequency of minority victories and of its expected payoff, relative
to the majority. In contrast with the B treatment, storable votes in the C treatment
leads to efficiency gains over simple majority voting.
The experimental design is summarized in Table 3. In all experiments the majority
was formed by 3 subjects and the minority by 2, with the exception of session b3 where
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the number of subjects in each group was 5 and 4 respectively. Session b3 serves us as a
control on the sensitivity of the experimental results to the size of the groups.
Table 3: Experimental Design
Session Groups size Subject pool # Subjects Rounds
b1 3,2 CIT 15 30
b2 3,2 UCLA 20 30
b3 5,4 UCLA 27 30
c1 3,2 UCLA 15 30
c2 3,2 PU 15 20
c3 3,2 PU 10 20
c21 3,2 CIT 12 30
c22 3,2 UCLA 16 30
c23 3,2 PU 12 20
cchat1 3,2 PU 10 20
cchat2 3,2 PU 15 15
5 Experimental Results
The experiment has two principle goals. First, we want to verify the extent to which
voting outcomes match the theoretical predictions: are minority subjects able to win
some of the votes? are they able to do so without loss of aggregate efficiency? Second, to
what extent does voting behavior match the theoretical predictions?
5.1 Voting Outcomes and Efficiency
5.1.1 How often do minority groups win?
The diagram on the left of Figure 2a summarizes the answer to this question. The vertical
axis is the percentage of times the minority prevailed in the experimental sessions, and the
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horizontal axis is the percentages of times it would have prevailed if all subjects had played
the equilibrium strategy, given the valuations drawn during the experiments. Different
treatments are indicated by different symbols, as described in the figure’s legend.
Figure 2 here
The figure can then be read in several ways. The vertical height tells us that the
minority won between 20 and 25 percent of the time in C, C2, and CChat, with little
dispersion among them; it won less frequently in the B sessions (around 15 percent of
the time) with the exception of the one experiment of size {5, 4}where the minority won
about 23 percent of the time.
Clearly, storable votes help the minority win. The difference in this effect across
treatments matches the theoretical predictions, as is evident from the way the points align
along the 45-degree line. The closer to the line a point is, the closer the experiment’s
results are to the equilibrium predictions. If we estimate a simple regression line, the
hypotheses of a unitary slope parameter and a zero constant term cannot be rejected
at standard confidence values.14 On average, the frequency of minority victories in the
experiments differs from the equilibrium predictions by 3 percentage points, without clear
outliers and without systematic treatment effects. We find this surprising because the
complexity of the individual equilibrium strategies in the basic C treatment (as opposed
to C2 and CChat) would suggest a larger discrepancy from equilibrium predictions in
that specific treatment, a discrepancy the data do not show.
5.1.2 Did the experimental payoff to the minority match the theoretical pre-
dictions?
The diagram on the right of figure 2a plots per capita minority payoff as percentage of
per capita majority payoff in the experiments on the vertical axis, and in equilibrium
on the horizontal axis, using the symbols of the previous figure to identify the different
14The estimated parameters are: 0.76 for the slope (standard error 0.23), and 3.4 for the constant term
(standard error 5.8).
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experimental sessions. In all C, C2 and Cchat treatments the relative minority payoff
was higher than in any B treatments, as predicted by the theory, ranging between 33 and
45 percent of the average majority payoff, versus 16 to 20 percent in the B treatments of
size {3, 2} and 30 percent in the B treatment of size {5, 4}. Again, the effect of the voting
mechanism in raising the minority’s payoff was significant. Out of eleven experimental
sessions, all but two are below the 45-degree line, suggesting that the minority was unable
to fully exploit the opportunity presented by the voting mechanism. But the discrepancy
is not large - the average distance from the 45-degree line is 5 percentage points, again
without clear outliers15 or treatment effects, which is small in comparison to the differences
across treatments. Again, if we estimate a regression line, we cannot reject the hypotheses
of unitary slope and zero constant.16
5.1.3 At what cost to the majority were the minority’s gains? At what cost
to overall efficiency?
The left-hand side of figure 2b plots the normalized total surplus in each session on the
vertical axis, against the equilibrium predictions on the horizontal axis. The equilibrium
predictions are calculated using the actual valuation draws in the experiment. Points on
the 45 degree line indicate a perfect match to the theory. The mean distance from the
45 degree line is only 7 percentage points, again with little evidence of outliers, versus a
mean equilibrium surplus share of 60 percent. As in the previous figures, we cannot reject
a regression line with unitary slope and zero constant, although the fit is poorer.17
The central question is how the efficiency of storable votes compares to the efficiency of
alternative voting systems - in our case against simple majority voting. In the diagram on
the right of figure 2b, the vertical axis is again the normalized total surplus in each session,
15Note that a plausible range of values in Figure 2b is between 0 (the outcome with simple majority
voting) and 100 (the expected outcome with random decision-making). In figure 2a, the corresponding
range is between 0 and 50.
16The estimated parameters are: 1.03 for the slope (standard error 0.19), and −6.2 for the constant
term (standard error 7.1).
17The estimated parameters are: 0.7 for the slope (standard error 0.40), and 14.1 for the constant term
(standard error 24.1).
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now plotted against the equivalent measure with simple majority voting calculated from
the actual intensity values. Theory predicts that data from C, C2 and CChat sessions
should lie above the 45-degree line, while B data should lie below. The prediction is
confirmed by the C and by the B experiments. Surprisingly, it is the ”easier” treatments
with coordination, C2 and Cchat, that fall short of the prediction. Once again, two
of the three most significant losses relative to non-storable votes occur in C2 sessions.
Pooling all C, C2 and CChat data, the mean difference in normalized surplus is +2
percentage points, compared to the theoretical prediction of +7. Pooling all B data, the
mean difference was approximately −10 percentage points, compared with the theoretical
prediction of −4.
The data from our experiment can be summarized in three main points. First, storable
votes help minorities substantially, both in terms of the frequency with which minorities
won decisions and in terms of the resulting benefits. Second correlation of intensities
works to the advantage of the minority. Third, the efficiency costs associated with the
increased representation of minority interests were small in magnitude. Without correla-
tion, storable votes induces (small) aggregate welfare losses, but with perfectly correlated
intensities, storable votes produced (small) welfare gains over simple majority voting.
5.2 Voting Behavior
We begin by studying individual behavior in the treatments that did not allow group
members to coordinate their strategies (B and C). Later we turn to group behavior and
discuss the effects of explicit coordination (treatments C2 and CChat).
5.2.1 Individual behavior
Storable votes allow voters to express intensity of preference by casting more votes, at
any given state, when they have stronger preferences. Hence, monotonicity of voting
strategies is at the core of the mechanism, and it is natural to analyze subject behavior
in our experiments by studying this property first.
To obtain a measure of monotonicity of individual behavior, we estimate monotonicity
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violations and cutpoints for each subject. For each subject we have K pairs of observa-
tions, where K equals either 20 or 30 depending on the session18. Each pair consists of
a first proposal intensity value and the number of votes cast for (or against) the first
proposal. The number of votes cast is always 1, 2, or 3. A perfectly monotone strategy is
one for which we can find two cutpoints, c1 ≤ c2 such that whenever the subject’s first
period valuation was below c1 the subject cast 1 vote, whenever the subject’s first period
valuation was above c2, the subject cast 3 votes, and for intermediate values between c1
and c2 the subject cast 2 votes. We calculate the number of monotonicity violations as
the minimum number of voting choices that would have to be changed, for each subject,
to make the strategy perfectly monotonic. We then identify the pair of cutpoints that is
consistent with such monotonic strategy. In some cases, multiple cutpoints are consistent
with the same number of monotonicity violations; when this happens, we select the pair
that is closest to the equilibrium cutpoints.
Figure 3a presents histograms of individual monotonicity violations in treatments B
and C. The horizontal axis is divided into deciles representing the percentage of violations
over the total number of voting decisions, and the vertical axis reports the fraction of
subjects that belong to each decile.
Figure 3 here
In the B treatment, 50 percent of the subjects have 3 or fewer violations out of 30
voting decisions (10 percent). In the C treatment, 57 percent of subjects had violation
rates less than or equal to 10 percent. As comparison, a voter choosing randomly whether
to cast 0, 1, or 2 bonus votes would have a violation rate converging to 67% as the number
of decisions becomes very large.19 The comparison makes clear that, although there is
some noise, individual choices indeed tend to be monotonic for most subjects.
18With the exception of session cchat2, with 15 rounds.
19To account for the smaller number of violations that would result from the small sample and the free
cutpoints, we simulated random behavior with 21 subjects and 30 rounds. We found that no subjects
had violation rates less or equal to 30 percent; 2 subjects were in the fourth decile; 8 in the fifth, and 11
in the sixth.
26
The estimated cutpoints for all individual subjects in the B and C sessions are dis-
played in figures 3b. Each point represents one subject’s estimated pair of cutpoints, with
c1 on the horizontal axis and c2 on the vertical axis. All cutpoints lying on the 45 degree
line involve no splitting of bonus votes: always casting either both or neither of the bonus
votes over the first decision. Moving to the upper left corner of the graph are cutpoints
that involve more and more splitting of bonus votes, i.e. using one bonus vote in each
period for a range of values that increases as one approaches the corner. The upper left
corner of the graph, at (0, 100) corresponds to always casting one bonus vote. Cutpoints
for subjects in the minority group are in the left graph and cutpoints for the subjects
in the majority group are in the right graph. The rates of monotonicity violations are
indicated by shading the points, with the darkest points having the fewest monotonicity
violations.
In the B treatments, the equilibrium cutpoints for both majority and minority subjects
are (50, 50): if everyone played the equilibrium strategies all points would be on the 45
degree line at 50. In the C treatments, (50, 50) remains an equilibrium for individual
minority subjects, but not for subjects in the majority, whose asymmetrical strategies are
contingent on the behavior of the other members of the group and cannot be identified
unambiguously in the figure.
Two features of the distribution of cutpoints appear in both treatments. First, the
minority cutpoints do cluster around (50, 50), and on average minority subjects whose
cutpoints are closer to equilibrium have lower violation rates. Second, bonus votes are
much more frequently split by majority voters, with little difference between the two
treatments in spite of the different theoretical predictions. Intuitively, even in model B,
majority voters have less to lose from splitting their bonus votes - their larger number
implies that they are guaranteed to always win one of the two decisions, and one single
vote more or less plays a smaller role than in the case of the minority. Consider the
parameter values used in the experiments and a committee of size (3, 2). The expected
loss to a voter deviating from his equilibrium strategy and always casting one bonus vote
over each proposal is 15 percent in model B and 50 percent in model C for a minority
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voter, versus 4 percent in model B and 8 percent in model C for a majority voter (relative
to the expected equilibrium payoff.)20 The difference in the cost of splitting one’s bonus
votes in the two models may play some role in the more pronounced clustering of the
minority cutpoints around the 45 degree line, and particularly around (50, 50) in the C
treatment.
5.2.2 Group behavior
The monotonicity of the individual strategies provides only a partial picture. Efficiency
requires group strategies to be monotonic in the group value. In the B treatment the
notion of ”group value” is not clearly defined because different subjects within a group
have different values. But we can check for ”group monotonicity” in the C treatment,
that is, we can check whether the sum of the votes by members of one group is mono-
tone in their (common) value. If there is heterogeneity in behavior, monotonicity at
the individual level need not imply monotonicity at the group level because individuals
are continuously rematched. The problem is particularly severe for the majority whose
individual equilibrium strategies are asymmetric.21
The histograms in the first row of Figure 4a illustrate the difficulty that groups had in
the C treatment. More than 40 percent of the groups had error rates above 20 percent,
compared to only 10 percent of individual subjects in the same sessions (see Figure 3a).
As expected, and as shown by the histogram on the right, most errors are associated with
the majority, where more than 60 percent of the groups had more than 20 percent error
rates.
Figure 4 here
A comparison of these results to monotonicity violations in the C2 and CChat treat-
20Supposing that all other voters play the equilibrium strategy. In model C, we consider the case where
the individual majority voter’s deviation causes the majority group strategy to switch from casting either
5 or 7 votes to always casting 6.
21We identify a group by the label in the experiment (group 1, group 2, etc.), but rematching im-
plies that the composition of each group continues to change. Note that if equilibrium strategies were
symmetrical, the changing composition of the group would not matter.
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ments allows us to study the role of explicit coordination. According to the histograms in
the second row of Figure 4, the open communication in CChat reduced group violations
dramatically: all minority groups and 2 out of 5 of the majority groups had fewer than 10
percent violations. More surprising is the poor performance of the C2 treatment, where
perfect coordination is imposed by the experimental design.22
These results leave us with a puzzle: if the aggregate group behavior of the experi-
mental subjects in sessions C often violates monotonicity, why did the outcomes of these
experiments - in terms of minority victories and efficiency - still conform to the the-
ory? Why did these sessions outperform, on average, the C2 sessions with apparently
comparable record of monotonicity violations. The answer comes from the underlying
monotonicity of the individual behavior in treatment C. Intuitively, because individual
subjects did cast their vote monotonically, the violations resulting from the uncoordinated
aggregation of the votes are numerous, but not large: they tend to be concentrated around
the cutpoints values. To verify this, the histograms in figure 4b summarize the distribu-
tion of the average distance of ”mistaken” (i.e. non-monotonic) voting choices from the
cutpoints, as percentage of the expected distance if voting choices were random.23 The
CChat experiments show the greatest consistency: with one outlier, all groups have error
distances below 20 percent of the random case. But it is the comparison between the
C and the C2 treatments that is particularly revealing in explaining the differences in
experimental outcomes: one-fourth of all C2 groups have error distances that are closer
to the purely random case than any of the C groups. As mentioned, this reflects mostly
one outlier session, c22, and how much of an outlier c22 is is made clear in the diagram
on the right, in the bottom row of figure 4b. Almost half of all groups in this session
22This appears to be the result of a single experimental session: session c22 conducted at UCLA (where
25 percent of the subjects had a rate of violations approaching 50 percent).
23Following this logic, these cutpoints are estimated so as to minimize the average distance (both in
the experimental data and in the theoretical random case). With a very large number of random voting
choices, the two cutpoints that minimize the expected errors’ distance are (50, 50). The frequency of
error is 2/3, with an average distance of 25, yielding an expected distance of 50/3. The corresponding
number in the experimental data is, for a given pair of cutpoints, the sum of all errors’ distances, divided
by K, the number of rounds in the experiment.
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have error distances that are closer to the purely random case than any of the C groups,
and less than one fifth have distances that are less than 10 percent of the random case,
a very different result from the other two C2 sessions. This explains why the aggregate
experimental payoff of session c22 falls short both of the theoretical prediction and of
the payoff with simple majority. As shown in figure 2b, these few cases were sufficient to
exact a cost in terms of efficiency, lowering the overall performance of the C2 treatment.
Why the treatment proved difficult to our subjects is an open question, although we can
speculate that the problem may come from the larger size of the individual strategy space:
each minority voter had 5 different choices of how many votes (2, 3, 4, 5, 6) to use in the
first period, and each majority voter had 7 different choices (3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9).
As in the analysis of individual behavior, the monotonicity analysis generates cutpoints
estimates.24 Group cutpoints are depicted in Figure 5, with minority cutpoints on the
left and majority cutpoints on the right. In line with the equilibrium predictions, we can
summarize the strategies of each group through two cutpoints, represented by a point in
the diagrams and equal to (50, 50) for both the minority and the majority.25
Figure 5 here
The first row of diagrams in Figure 5 refers to C treatments; the second row to C2 and
the last to CChat. As in Figure 3b, darker points indicate fewer monotonicity violations.
Coordination affects the cutpoints of the minority groups: none of the estimated cutpoints
in treatments C2 and CChat lies outside the 45 degree line, as opposed to what we observe
in treatment C. Thus in treatments C2 and CChat, in accordance with equilibrium the
behavior of all minority groups is best described as voting either 2 (at lower values) or 6
(at higher values), with some dispersion around the equilibrium cutpoints (50, 50). The
majority’s behavior, on the other hand, is best described as splitting the bonus votes for
24The cutpoints estimates that minimize the number of monotonicity violations need not be identical to
those that minimize the errors’ distance. In practice, they differ mostly in the case of those subjects with
more random behavior. The substance of the results does not change, and we report here the cutpoints
the minimize the number of violations, for consistency with the discussion of individual behavior.
25For the majority groups, we treat as identical all payoff-equivalent strategies, i.e. voting either 3, or
4, or 5 below gl, and voting either 7, or 8, or 9 above gh.
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some intermediate range of values. In addition, the light shading of most points in the
majority figures reflects the relatively large number of monotonicity violations for any
estimate of cutpoints. The relatively greater deviation from equilibrium by the majority
groups may reflect their relative low cost of such deviations. With a single coordinated
strategy, the expected percentage loss to the majority from always splitting the bonus
votes is about 8 percent when the minority plays the equilibrium strategy.26 For the
minority, on the other hand, splitting the bonus votes can be very costly: a minority
always casting 4 votes always loses against a majority casting 5 votes at valuations below
50 and 7 at valuations above 50.
6 Conclusions
Majoritarian principles are a fundamental ingredient of democratic institutions. But
they carry with them the risk of disenfranchising minority groups and endangering the
stability of the system, by violating principles of both equity and efficiency. In a well-
designed democracy, a judicial system protecting the rights of minority groups needs to
be supplemented by political remedies that ensure the minority a voice through the daily,
ordered exercise of political rights. This paper has analyzed the potential of a simple
voting system - storable votes - to fulfill this function. By granting voters a stock of votes
to be divided as desired over a series of multiple binary decisions, storable votes allow
the minority to accumulate votes on specific issues and to win sometime. Because the
minority wins only if its strength of preferences is high, and the majority’s is low, the
gains in terms of equity have little if any cost in terms of efficiency.
We have studied two related models where two groups of different size have consistently
opposite preferences. In our ”correlated” model, C, all members of a group - whether the
majority or the minority - agree not only on on the direction of their preferences but also
on the strength of their preferences. If we think in terms of political parties, these would
26In fact, in this model the majority’s maximin strategy entails splitting the bonus votes. It corresponds
to cutpoints (25, 100): cast no bonus votes for values below 25, but split the bonus votes for all values
above 25.
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be parties with strong discipline; more generally, the model is best suited to represent
groups with some level of organization, sufficient to agree on the set of priorities. In our
”basic” model, model B, on the other hand, all members of a group agree on the direction
of their preferences, and the two groups have opposite preferences, but within a group
the members’ priorities may differ. The groups are not organized.
There are many directions for further research. We limit ourselves to mentioning
two. First, it would be interesting to compare storable votes to a larger set of alterna-
tive mechanisms, both theoretically and experimentally. These alternative mechanisms
should include vetoes, serial dictatorship and even more complex systems such as the
one proposed in Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007). Storable votes are more flexible but
more complicated than vetoes, and less flexible and less complicated than the Jackson and
Sonnenschein mechanism. Serial dictatorship requires a secondary mechanism to allocate
decisions to specific individuals or groups in a somewhat efficient fashion. What can the
theory tell us, and how would all compare experimentally?27 Second, the sensitivity of
storable votes to agenda manipulation is an open question. The agenda setting procedure
should be part of the overall game, and voters will decide how many votes to cast knowing
how new issues are brought to a vote. A priori it is not clear whether problems will arise:
having multiple votes that can be shifted across proposals may make the order of the
proposals more important, but also increase the ability to resist possible manipulations
of this order. On the other hand, the additional consideration of political minorities may
exacerbate possible problems, either because majority losses are particularly expensive
in terms of efficiency or because the minority may end up unable to ever control any
outcome.
27Two recent experimental analyses are Engelmann and Grimm (2006) on the Jackson-Sonnenschein
mechanism, and Kagel et al. (2005) on veto power. Neither paper compares different mechanisms.
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8 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose that x∗Mt(vi, Bt, t) and x
∗
mt(vi, Bt, t) exist. Consider
candidate equilibrium strategies {x′it(vi, Bt, t)} for model C , where
∑
i∈m x
′
it(vi, B, t) =
x∗mt(vi, B, t) and
∑
i∈M x
′
it(vi, B, t) = x
∗
Mt(vi, B, t). Because preferences between the two
groups are always opposed, at any state only the aggregate voting choice of the opposite
group affects voters’ payoffs. In addition, because in model C preferences within each
group are always perfectly correlated, by definition {x′it(vi, B, t)}, i ∈ m maximize the
expected payoff of each individual minority member, given x∗Mt(vi, B, t) (and similarly for
{x′it(vi, B, t)}, i ∈M , given x∗mt(vi, B, t)). It follows that no individual deviation from the
prescribed strategies can be profitable and {x′it(vi, Bt, t)} must be equilibrium strategies.
Note that in general the equilibrium will not be unique: any permutation of individual
strategies that leaves the aggregate vote for the group unchanged, at given state, is an
equilibrium. ¤
Proof of Lemma 2. (i) Existence of equilibrium in pure strategies. Milgrom and
Weber (1985) discuss conditions for existence of an equilibrium in distributional strategies.
In particular, conditional on a publicly observed variable, individual types are required to
be independent. The publicly observed information in our case is each voter’s membership
in one of the two groups, and hence the support of the distribution from which valuations
are drawn. Conditional on such support, individual valuations are independent in case
B. The arguments in Casella (2005) remain applicable here. Hence an equilibrium in
pure strategies exists for model B . Conditional on public information on the support of
each distribution, valuations are independent in the two-voter version of model C. Again,
the arguments in Casella (2005) apply, and an equilibrium in pure strategies exists. But
since such an equilibrium must be an equilibrium of the n -voter C game, it follows that
an equilibrium in pure strategies of the n -voter C game exists. (ii) Monotonicity of the
equilibrium strategies. Call a strategy monotonic if, at a given state, the number of votes
cast is monotonically increasing in the intensity of preferences vit. Casella et al. (2006)
shows that at any given state all individual best response strategies must be monotonic
when members of each group do not play correlated strategies. Thus the argument applies
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immediately to equilibria of model B. It also applies to the two-voter version of model
C, and hence to group strategies, as opposed to individual strategies, in the equilibrium
we focus on in the n-voter C game. If, at any given state, all best response strategies
must be monotonic and an equilibrium exists, it follows that equilibrium strategies must
be monotonic. Because there is a continuum of types and a finite set of strategies, then it
must be that monotonic equilibrium strategies must take the form of monotone cutpoint
strategies. ¤
Proof of Theorem 1. We begin by proving the second part of the theorem. Consider
any candidate equilibrium where the minority is expected to lose with probability 1 over
each decision. A minority member cannot be worse off by cumulating all his bonus votes on
one decision. Over all decisions, there must be at least one where with positive probability
the majority casts no more than MB0/T bonus votes, and since the minority can never
cast fewer than m total votes, a deviating minority member can always find a decision
where with positive probability the difference in votes cast is at most M(1 +B0/T )−m.
Thus with positive probability the outcome of that decision changes and deviation is
profitable if M(1 +B0/T ) ≤ m+B0, or B0(1−M/T ) ≥M −m. This condition requires
T > M , and in this case becomes B0 ≥ T (M − m)/(T −M). For all M and m, the
condition is sufficient and applies to both models B and C. Since we know by Lemma 2
that an equilibrium exists for arbitrary F , T,M and m, it must be that if T > M , and
B0 ≥ T (M −m)/(T −M) the minority is expected to win sometime with strictly positive
probability in all equilibria. We now prove the first part of the theorem. Suppose T ≤M .
Consider the following candidate equilibrium: at time t = 1, xi1 = 1 + B0 for i ∈ m and
xj1 = 1 for j ∈ M; at all other other times t 6= 1, xit = 1 and xjt = 1 + B0/(T − 1).
If m(1 + B0) > M or B0 > (M − m)/m the minority always wins the first vote, while
the majority always wins all other votes. No individual minority member can gain from
deviation, for all possible realizations of his valuations, if m + B0 < M [1 + B0/(T − 1)],
or B0[1−M/(T − 1)] < M −m, a condition always satisfied when T ≤M . No majority
member can gain from deviating, again for all possible realizations of his valuations, if
m(1 +B0) > M +B0 or B0 > (M −m)/(m− 1), a threshold that is finite for all m > 1.
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Thus if T ≤ M , m > 1, and B0 > (M − m)/(m − 1), the strategies described are an
equilibrium, and the minority always wins the first vote. ¤
Proof of Theorem 2. Consider the following strategies. Over the first T − 2 pro-
posals, each minority member always casts only the regular vote; each majority member
casts 1 + b votes. At T − 1, each minority member casts only his regular vote if vm < α,
for a fixed α > 0, and all bonus votes otherwise; each majority members casts 1+ b votes
if vM < α and 1 + h otherwise, where b + h + (T − 2)b = B0. In the last election, all
remaining votes are cast.
We show in step (i) that for all M and m ≥ 2 there exist non-negative values of B0, b,
h, and T for which such strategies are equilibrium strategies, and the minority wins at
T − 1 if (vmT−1 > α, vMT−1 < α), and at T if (vmT−1 < α, vMT−1 > α), but always loses
otherwise. We then show in (ii) that in such an equilibrium EV0 > EW0 if m > M/2.
Because the theorem requires m > M/2, it cannot apply to m = 1.
(i) The minority wins at T − 1 if (vmT−1 > α, vMT−1 < α), and at T if (vmT−1 <
α, vMT−1 > α) if:
m(1 +B0) > M(1 + b) (A1)
and loses in all other cases if:
M(1 + h) > m(1 +B0) (A2)
Any unilateral deviation by a minority voter is ruled out if:
m+B0 < M(1 + b) (A3)
Similarly, any unilateral deviation by a majority voter is ruled out if:
M + (M − 1)b+B0 < m(1 +B0) (A4)
If there exist values of B0, b, h, and T for which these four inequalities are satisfied
simultaneously, and the budget constraint b+h+(T −2)b = B0 holds, then the strategies
are an equilibrium, delivering the outcomes described above. It is immediate that (A4)
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implies (A1). Hence, susbstituting the budget constraint in (A2), three conditions must
be satisfied:
T < 1 +
(B0 + 1)(M −m)
Mb
(A2’)
B0 < (M −m) +Mb (A3’)
B0 >
M −m
m− 1 +
M −m
m− 1 b (A4’)
If we ignore integer constraints, then for all m ≥ 2 (A3’) and (A4’) are satisifed for
any positive b. With b arbitrarily small, T can be arbitrarily large, and the equilibrium
can be supported for any positive finite T . Integer constraints are however part of the
environment, and in general impose an upper bound on T , T , which depends onM andm.
The following observations follow immediately from (A2’), (A3’) an (A4’): (a) if m > 2 ,
then for all M > m, there is an equilibrium with b = 1, B0 integer ∈ (2(M −m)/(m− 1),
2M − m), and T (M,m) > 2; (b) if m = 2, then the only relevant case satisfying the
constraint M < 2m is M = 3. For m = 2 and M = 3, there is an equilibrium with b = 2,
B0 = 6 and T = 13/6 > 2.
(ii). In any equilibrium of this type, EV0 > EW0 iff:
F (α)
[
M
∫ α
0
vdF (v) + F (α)M
∫ 1
0
vdF (v)
]
+
+[1− F (α)]
[
M
∫ 1
α
vdF (v) + [1− F (α)]M
∫ 1
0
vdF (v)
]
+
+F (α)
[
M
∫ 1
α
vdF (v) + [1− F (α)]m
∫ 1
0
vdF (v)
]
+
+F (α)
[
m
∫ 1
α
vdF (v) + [1− F (α)]M
∫ 1
0
vdF (v)
]
> 2M
∫ 1
0
vdF (v)
Simplifying:
F (α) [MF (α) +m(1− F (α))]
∫ 1
0
vdF (v)+ (A5)
+[mF (α) +M(1− F (α))]
∫ 1
α
vdF (v) > M
∫ 1
0
vdF (v)
Note that the left-hand side simplifies to M
∫ 1
0
vdF (v) when evaluated at either α = 0 or
α = 1, since in both cases the majority always wins (and thus EV0 = EW0). Taking the
38
derivative of (A5) with respect to α and evaluating it at α = 0, we obtain:
∂(EV0 − EW0)
∂α
∣∣∣∣
α=0
= f(0)
∫ 1
0
vdF (v)(2m−M) > 0⇔ m > M/2
Thus if m > M/2 there exists a threshold α > 0 such that the strategies described above
lead to higher ex ante welfare than simple majority voting. ¤
Proof of the Proposition. Model B.
(a) Equilibrium. To verify that the strategy described is an equilibrium, consider the
best response for voter i. If i casts xi1 votes in the vote over the first proposal, his expected
utility over the whole game is: EUi|xi1 = vi1prob(W1|xi1) + E(v)prob(W2|4 − xi1) where
prob(Wt|xit) is i’s probability of obtaining the desired outcome in period t conditional
on casting xit votes, and from the symmetry of F , E(v) = 0.5. Since (n − 1) is an even
number, and every other voter is casting either 1 or 3 votes, the difference in votes between
the two sides, excluding i, must be even for both proposals. Thus, when i considers the
choice between casting 3, 2 or 1 votes, the only case in which the choice matters is a
difference of 2 votes in his side disfavor, either over proposal 1 or proposal 2:
EUi|3 > EUi|2⇔ vi1[prob(∆x1−i = 2)] > 0.5[prob(∆x2−i = 2)]
EUi|2 > EUi|1⇔ vi1[prob(∆x1−i = 2)] > 0.5[prob(∆x2−i = 2)]
(where ∆xt−i indicates the number of votes by which i’s side is losing over proposal Pt,
absent i’s vote). Given the symmetry of F , in the candidate equilibrium the probabil-
ity of any other voter casting 1 or 3 votes is identical, implying: prob(∆x1−i = 2) =
prob(∆x2−i = 2). Thus i’s best response is to cast 1 vote if vi1 < 0.5 and 3 votes if
vi1 > 0.5; the conclusion holds for all i, and the strategy is indeed an equilibrium. If
M > 3m, prob(∆x1−i = 2) = prob(∆x2−i = 2) = 0 , and the number of votes cast is
irrelevant.
(b) Frequency of minority victories. Write the majority size as M = m+2k− 1, with
k ≥ 1 (recall than n is odd). The minority wins the first vote if there are at least k more
valuations above 0.5 among the minority than the majority. Given the symmetry of F ,
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the probability of this event is given by the formula in the lemma. The minority wins the
second vote if there are at least k more valuations below 0.5 over the first proposal among
the minority than the majority, an event that again, given the symmetry of F , has the
probability given in the lemma. Note that the two events are mutually exclusive and that
the probability can be positive only if k < m, implying that the majority always wins if
M > 3m.
(c) Expected equilibrium payoff. With n odd and the equilibrium strategies described
above, the difference in votes cast by the two groups is always an even number. In
addition, the symmetry of F guarantees that the probability of any given difference in
votes is equal over the two proposals. If we call prob(WM |x) the probability of obtaining
the desired outcome for i ∈M , conditional on casting x votes, then, given F Uniform, we
can write the ex ante expected payoff of a majority member as:
EVBi = (3/8)prob(WM |1) + (5/8)prob(WM |3) ∀i ∈M
where prob(WM |1) = prob(xM−i ≥ xm) and prob(WM |3) = prob(xM−i ≥ xm − 2). Recall
that M = m + 2k − 1. Given the equilibrium strategies, the symmetry of F , and the
independence of the valuation draws, if we call ”high” a valuation above 0.5, prob(xM−i ≥
xm) equals the probability that the number of high draws in the minority group is at most
k − 1 higher than for the majority group, excluding voter i:
prob(WM |1) = 1−
m∑
s=k
[
m−s∑
r=0
(
M − 1
r
)(
m
r + s
)]
2−(M−1+m)
Similarly, prob(xM−i ≥ xm − 2) equals the probability that the number of high draws in
the minority group is at most k higher than for the majority group, excluding voter i:
prob(WM |3) = 1−
m∑
s=k+1
[
m−s∑
r=0
(
M − 1
r
)(
m
r + s
)]
2−(M−1+m)
Analogous calculations yield the ex ante expected payoff of a minority member:
EVBj = (3/8)prob(Wm|1) + (5/8)prob(Wm|3) ∀j ∈ m
where:
prob(Wm|1) =
m−1∑
s=k
[
m−s−1∑
r=0
(
M
r
)(
m− 1
r + s
)]
2−(M+m−1)
40
and
prob(Wm|3) =
m−1∑
s=k−1
[
m−s−1∑
r=0
(
M
r
)(
m− 1
r + s
)]
2−(M+m−1)
Ex ante aggregate expected payoff in equilibrium is then: EVB = M(EVBi) +m(EVBj),
i ∈ M , j ∈ m. The expressions can be simplified slightly, and after some manipulations
we derive:
EVB > EW0 =M ⇐⇒ 5
8
(M +m)(
3m−M−1
2
)
!
(
3M−m−1
2
)
!
>
>
m∑
s=k
M
(m− s)!(M − 1 + s)! −
m−1∑
s=k
m
(m− s− 1)!(M + s)!
where k = (M−m+1)/2. It is then simple to verify that for allM = 3m−1 (i.e. k = m)
or M = 3m− 3 (i.e. k = m− 1), EVB < EW0. At the same time, for M large enough it
is not difficult to find values of m =M − 1 (k = 1) such that EVB > EW0, and generate
examples that satisfy the statement in the lemma. M ′ = 8, m′ = 3 and m′′ = 7 is one
such example; M ′ = 6, m′ = 3 and m′′ = 5 is another.
Model C.
(a) Equilibrium. If 2M > 3m, by setting xM1 = 2M for all vM1 the majority can guar-
antee itself victory over both proposals. All minority strategies are equivalent, including
xm1 = m if vm1 < 0.5 and xm1 = 3m if vm1 > 0.5. No deviation can be profitable for a
member of either group, and the strategies are an equilibrium. Suppose then 2M ≤ 3m.
When xm = m, the minority always loses (m < max{M,m + 3} < min{3M, 4M −
(m+3)}). The only possible deviation for a minority member is to cast 2 or 3 votes when
xm−i = m−1, butm+2 < max{M,m+3} < min{3M, 4M−(m+3)}: the deviation cannot
be profitable. The majority always wins when casting min{3M, 4M − (m+3)} votes, but
loses when xM = max{M,m+3} if xm = 3m. A majority member could deviate and use
his bonus votes when xM−i =max{M−1,m+2}. But casting 2 votes cannot be profitable:
with 2M ≤ 3m, max{M+1,m+4} < 3m. And neither can casting 3: with 2M ≤ 3m, ei-
ther max{M+2,m+5} < 3m and min{3M−2, 4M−(m+5)} > 3m, in which case the out-
comes are unchanged; or max{M+2,m+5} > 3m and min{3M−2, 4M−(m+5)} < 3m,
in which case the certainty of winning at vM > 0.5 is traded for the certainty of winning
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in the future, with E(v) = 0.5 - a net loss in expected utility. Hence xm1 = m if
vm1 < 0.5 and xm1 = 3m if vm1 > 0.5; and xM1 = max{M,m + 3} if vM1 < 0.5 and
xM1 = min{3M, 4M − (m+ 3)} if vM1 > 0.5 are equilibrium strategies.
(b) Frequency of minority victories. If 2M ≤ 3m the minority wins the first vote if
(vm1 > 0.5∩ vM1 < 0.5) and the second if (vm1 < 0.5∩ vM1 > 0.5) - given the symmetry
of F , it wins each vote with probability 0.25.
(c) Expected equilibrium payoff. If 2M > 3m, the majority always wins and the
expected aggregate payoff over the two proposals equals M . If 2M ≤ 3m, the expected
aggregate payoff equals: (1/4)(M/4+M/2)+(1/4)(3M/4+M/2)+(1/4)(3M/4+m/2)+
(1/4)(3m/4+M/2) = (13M+5m)/16 (where the first term is the expected payoff over the
two proposals when (vm1 < 0.5∩ vM1 < 0.5), the second when (vm1 > 0.5∩ vM1 > 0.5),
the third when (vM1 > 0.5∩ vm1 < 0.5), and the fourth when (vm1 > 0.5∩ vM1 < 0.5) -
all events with probability 1/4). With simple majority voting,the majority always wins
and over the two proposals EW0 = M for all M,m. In this storable votes equilibrium,
EV0 = M if 2M > 3m, but EV0 = (13M + 5m)/16 > M for all 2M ≤ 3m, establishing
the result in the lemma. ¤
Construction of Figure 1. Model B
(a) Efficient frequency of minority victories. According to our efficiency criterion, the
minority should win whenever the sum of its valuations is larger than the sum of the
majority’s valuations. Call y (z) the sum of m (M) independent random variables, each
distributed Uniformly over [0, 1]. The efficient frequency of minority victories is then
given by
∫ m
0
(∫ m
z
Pm(y)dy
)
PM(z)dz where:
Pm(y) =
1
2(m− 1)!
m∑
s=0
(−1)s
(
m
s
)
(y − s)m−1sign(y − s) (A6)
(and correspondingly for PM(z)).
(b) Expected aggregate payoff under first best efficiency. For each proposal, the ex ante
efficient aggregate payoff EU∗B is easily derived, given (A6):
EU∗B =
∫ m
0
(∫ m
z
yPm(y)dy
)
PM(z)dz +
∫ m
0
(∫ M
y
zPM(z)dz
)
Pm(y)dy (A7)
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Over the two proposals, the ex ante efficient payoff is 2EU∗B. The first term in (A7)
corresponds to the efficient expected payoff for the minority group, and the second for
the majority group. The corresponding per capita values (multiplied by 2) are plotted in
Figure 1b.
(c) Random choice. If each group has a fifty percent chance of winning any vote, Given
E(v) = 1/2, the aggregate expected payoff is 1/2(M/2) + 1/2(m/2) over each proposal,
or (M +m)/2 for the 2-proposal game.
Model C
(a) Efficient frequency of minority victories. Given the perfect correlation of valuations
within each group, the efficient frequency of minority victories is given by prob(MvM <
mvm) =
∫ 1
0
∫ (m/M)vm
0
dvMdvm = m/(2M).
(b) Expected aggregate payoff under first best efficiency. In model C we can represent
the total valuation of the minority (majority) group by a random variable y (z), Uniformly
distributed over [0,m] ([0,M ]). The efficient aggregate expected payoff, per proposal, is
given by:
EU∗C =
∫ m
0
(∫ m
z
y
m
dy
)
1
M
dx+
∫ m
0
(∫ M
y
z
M
dz
)
1
m
dy =
m2 + 3M2
6M
(A4)
Over the two proposals, the ex ante efficient payoff is 2EU∗C . The first term in (A4)
corresponds to the efficient expected payoff for the minority group (m2/(3M)), and the
second for the majority group ((3M2 −m2)/6M). The corresponding per capita values
(multiplied by 2) are plotted in Figure 1b.
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FIGURE 1 
T=B0=2; F(v) Uniform; M=m+1 
 
Figure 1a. Frequency of minority victories 
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Figure 1b. Expected payoff for majority and minority members (per capita). 
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Figure 1c. Expected aggregate payoff as share of the available surplus 
 
 
Model B                                                                                                Model C 
          5 10 15 20
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
m                         5 10 15 20
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
 m 
 
 
The large black dots plot equilibrium payoffs with storable votes; the grey dots efficient payoffs, and 
the small black dots payoffs with simple majority voting.      
 
FIGURE 2  
Experimental Outcomes 
 
Figure 2a: Minorities’  Outcomes. 
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FIGURE 3 
 Individual Behavior 
 
   Figure 3a: Monotonicity violations  
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Figure 3b: Cutpoints 
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FIGURE 4 
Group Behavior - Monotonicity violations 
 
Figure 4a: Percentage of violations 
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Figure 4b: Average errors’ distance relative to random voting 
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FI GURE 5 
Group Behavior - Group Cutpoints 
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Black: share of errors below 10 % 
Dark grey:  between 10 and 20 % 
Light grey:  above 20 % 
